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23 July 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Brockway McMillan

8/16/63

1. At Dr. McMillan's request I met with him in his office at 3:30 this afternoon, 23 July, to discuss TAGBOARD.

2. The meeting opened with an informal discussion of our early retirement program, with which I am presently involved on the Hill, and some discussion of the Clandestine Services purely to break the ice and indicate that the Agency also does things other than NRO activities.

3. Dr. McMillan stated that he was not prepared to draw back from his TAGBOARD memorandum, unless so directed by Mr. McNamara, presumably generated by a protest from Mr. McCone. He stated that he wished to assign a project officer to the Agency to push forward on the program and that at the end of three months which would be a transition period, the entire program would be switched over to Leo Geary's shop [redacted] for management. I replied that we were entirely agreeable to having the Air Force supply a Project Director, that this had been suggested by Dr. Charyk previously, and that we had agreed with alacrity and enthusiasm but that nothing had come of it. I did not, however, feel that I could agree to determining now that a transition should take place in three months. I felt very strongly that in view of our need for full-scale and primary emphasis on OXCART and the difficulties that we still had to overcome in that program, I could not accept any move now which might degrade that program, particularly such as introducing a new technical management agency at this stage of the game. Further, I felt that if and when OXCART or any of its corollary vehicles were surfaced or uncovered, the only remaining true capability that could be kept covert would be TAGBOARD. Accordingly, it must remain covert

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and therefore should remain under Program B. I therefore proposed that the project officer come over and dig in right away and that we would defer any decision on transition until about six months from now when we should have a much better idea of where OXCART stood and we might even have some feel for the policy decisions that might be required in this connection. In other words, I felt that we were talking about whether the glass was half full or half empty and I suggested that he consider it along my lines of making the decision at a later date. He neither acquiesced nor objected but did say he would get with Geary as soon as Geary returned from leave to decide who should come over as the project officer. As the matter now stands, TAGBOARD is being budgeted by [REDACTED] and I propose to hold to this line with the technical management remaining in [REDACTED] (under [REDACTED] in CIA).

4. On other subjects, we discussed as follows:

a. I recommended both [REDACTED] very strongly for promotion and stated that I intended to write to General Schriever, particularly on [REDACTED] (and I think to General McKee on [REDACTED]), pointing out their total objectivity, their complete dedication, their lack of parochialism, and their high competence and recommending that they both be considered for promotion to Brigadier General. Dr. McMillan agreed with me completely.

b. I told Dr. McMillan that we still had remaining in the Agency considerable competence in the satellite area and that I would like to see it utilized more in the overall NRO program. I proposed that more CIA people be assigned to the NRO staff and that CIA people be proliferated into the various other programs. I suggested that Greer could use a CIA man as a deputy. I pointed out that over 50% of our people were from the Air Force throughout our programs and that this was a very healthy atmosphere. I pointed out that he did not have in the NRO staff or in Greer's staff people who were directly oriented to the needs of the intelligence community and that I felt by the input of CIA officers who are already thoroughly

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indoctrinated in intelligence requirements, he would have a much better, all-around organization to meet intelligence requirements. He stated he was not too thoroughly familiar with the NRO staff but that my proposal had appeal and that he would look into it.

c. I then proposed that he call in all of his Program Directors and their deputies, perhaps about twenty people altogether, and have a one- or two-day symposium on just why they were in business, just why there was an NRO, just what their responsibilities were, particularly slanted toward their primary function of intelligence collection. I recommended that Mr. McCone address this group and that it might also be helpful to have Dr. Land and General Doolittle present. My purpose in this was to make abundantly certain that the people running our programs know that their sole purpose is to develop intelligence and not just to be shooting another rocket in the air. He thought this was an excellent idea and said he would follow up on it, probably in September, after people had returned from vacation, etc. I immediately volunteered to be a Program Director so I could get a vacation too.

d. I told him that my grapevine indicated that General Greer had decided to take over contracting of all of his projects. This was as of today, a rumor which I had not verified nor had my people. I brought it up not as an issue but to point out that

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downgrade these capabilities were not in the best interests of NRO and certainly not in the best national interests of an exotic intelligence collection program. I got the impression he was in complete agreement although he did not comment.

5. The meeting ended in good order and, based on this memo, I am writing a letter to Dr. McMillan to try to pin down some of the foregoing points.


Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

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..... OXCART. TAGBOARD .....

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